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'Harambee!', meaning 'Pull Together!', is Kenya's national motto. Over
the years it has become used to describe projects for which resources
are raised by self-help methods, independently of government. Local
committees have initiated harambee health centres, cattle dips, dams,
roads, community buildings, schools, fish ponds, bridges and youth
centres. Perhaps the best known internationally of Kenya's harambee
projects since independence have been the harambee secondary schools
which could be described as the major force behind the explosive
expansion of the country's secondary education system during the
1960s. In 1971 the harambee movement took an interesting and
unexpected new turn, when local self.help committees throughout
Kenya began raising large sums of money for the establishment of
harambee institutes of technology. The idea caught the national
imagination in an unprecedented way and by October 1973 such
institutes had been proposed for fourteen districts, in addition to two
already in operation. This article is a short report on research carried
out by the authors in 1972/73 under the auspices of IDS Nairobi, into
the origins and prospects of these embryo institutions.'
The sponsors of the institutes of technology have made educational
history. Technical training in Africa has usually been foisted on
unwilling recipients by paternalistic colonial governments, missionaries
or foreign advisers. In this case, by contrast, it has been wholly initiated
by local interests. As King2 says, Kenya is the 'first country voluntarily
* Martin Godfrey is a Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies. G.C.M.
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1 Fuller reports are contained in: The Political Economy of Self-Help: Kenya's
'Harambee' Institutes of Technology, Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. VIII
no. 1, 1974, and Politics, Economics and Technical Training - a Kenyan case
study, East African Literature Bureau, forthcoming.
2 Kenneth King, 'Some Preliminary Notes on Technological Self-Help in Kenya',
paper in Developmental Trends in Kenya, proceedings of a seminar held in the
Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, April 1972.
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to espouse training on this scale in Africa'. For an explanation of these
surprising institutions we have to look to a conjunction of political and
economic trends.
During the first ten years of independence, in the absence of a strong
political party with a systematic ideology, support from constituencies
needed to be won through proofs of effectiveness in promoting local
development. Politics moved from the capital to the outlying districts
and became increasingly tribal. Meanwhile, within the African class
which came to power after independence, the civil servants were
beginning to establish their supremacy over the professional politicians.
The salary-structure, related to educational level and operating wide
differentials between levels, had produced a flood of merely
academically qualified persons with none of the technical skills actually
in scarce supply. Technical training institutes were consequently an
obvious and attractive alternative to further secondary schools for
harambee organizers.
In these circumstances the institutes of technology, first of all, provide
platforms for those bidding for local leadership. In this they are like
previous harambee, only bigger. Secondly, they are, as we shall argue
later, an interesting manifestation of the further spread of bureaucratic
influence - for the first time we have harambee projects initiated by
civil servants rather than by politicians. Thirdly, they may represent a
new stage in the tribai.ization of Kenyan politics, a process which has
already gone a long way. Fourthly, the fact of dependency sets the
constraints within which the institutes will operate, affecting both what
they can do and what their impact on the economy and society can be.
The plans, or rather aspirations, of the institutes vary a great deal -
from the near-university-level courses of Ramogi Institute of Advanced
Technology, near Kisumu, to the village-polytechnic or technical-school
curricula of Embu Karurumo, Maa (Kajiado) and Samoei (Nandi).
These aspirations have already been scaled down significantly and will
undoubtedly be scaled down further in the face of fund-raising
difficulties, increases in cost estimates and the growing realization of
the difficulties involved in setting up and running high-level technical
training institutions. Although the entrance requirement of secondary
form IV schooling, stipulated by most, is likely to remain, it would not
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be surprising to find the majority of institutes, starting with courses at
skilled rather than semi-professional level. The difficulties that the
institutes are likely to meet in fund-raising can be illustrated by a
comparison of their combined initial fund-raising targets of Shs 200
million (about $28 million) with actual cash contributions for all
self-help purposes during the six-year period 1967-72, estimated at Shs
124 million ($17 million), a shortfall of 38 per cent. Indeed it begins to
appear that the crucial determinant of the institutes' achievement and
impact will be the amount of foreign capital aid that they are able to
attract. We estimate, on plausible assumptions, that for all the institutes
to reach their fund-raising targets by 1977 over Shs 100 million ($14
million) in foreign aid will be needed. Since aid on such a scale is
unlikely, the immediate impact of these projects may be rather smaller
than had originally been thought. Nevertheless, sooner or later the
institutes will be making demands on the Kenyan economy, particularly
for staff and recurrent finance, which will be difficult to meet. The
prospect of taking over responsibility from their recurrent expenditure
must be particularly worrying for the Kenyan Treasury.
A further constraint is the existing system of technical training. In
general, the sort of training that is going on in the formal sector,
whether on or off the job, is the sort of training which is required by
foreign-dominated industry using imported technology and imported
standards. Moreover, the increasing formalization o f
apprentice-training, with its levies and stringent requirements, is likely
tu be at the expense of the cheap and efficient (albeit exploitative)
training which is going on in the informal sector. We carried out a
survey of existing training institutions and of their plans for expansion.
This highlighted the problem of the shortage of staff, which was
particularly acute at sub-professional level, and showed the way in
which unit cost tended to rise with the level of training. It also
identified certain categories for which there appear to be adequate
facilities (in relation to the demands of the existing political/economic
structure3) and others for which they are inadequate. Almost 34.000
technicians and craftsmen, our survey suggested, are likely to emerge
from existing training institutions and on-the-job training in 1972-7 7 -
But not, of course, necessarily in relation to the demands of any alternative or
'ideal' structure.
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representing an annual average rate of increase in the stock of such
skilled workers of between 5 and 7 per cent. Perhaps the most
interesting finding here is that, although many of the institutes have
based their plans on the supposed shortage of engineering technicians,
in fact this group is reasonably well supplied with training facilities.
Indeed, this might be a category in which accelerated Kenyanization
will become necessary to avoid a surplus. In other words, the graduates
of the harambee institutes may find themselves in sharp competition
with those of the official institutes; and the government may find itself
with an excess of technically trained people.
Some have suggested that overproduction, particularly of technicians,
would impart a more technical orientation to society and open new
areas of innovation. Kenya is certainly starting from a relatively low
level of indigenous technical skill and consciousness. Traditional skills,
such as smithing, and apprenticeship systems existed in pre-colonial
times. But during the colonial period Indian craftsmen and technicians
were imported, so that it was not necessary to encourage Africans to
acquire industrial skills. Also, the racially segregated education and
training system effectively prevented those Africans who wanted to
acquire higher-level skills from doing so. Meanwhile the structure of
demand changed in such a way that the traditional skills and
apprenticeships largely fell out of use. In this context the campaign for
institutes of technology is at least encouraging in the sense that it is
raising questions about the role of technology in development, the
means of adapting technology to local needs, the relative importance to
society of technically and academically educated people and the types
of economic strategy that encourage innovation.
However, we are far from optimistic about the chances of the institutes
of technology technicalizing African society through their output of
trained technicians. For one thing, we are sceptical about the possibility
of training institutions in a dependent economy doing much more, in
their curricula and syllabuses, than reflect the demands of the existing
political/economic structure. In this case, these are not for craftsmen
and technicians skilled in improvising solutions to a wide range of
technical problems. Instead they are for people trained to service the
products sold by or the machines used in a particular firm and to
replace rather than to repair, whenever difficulty arises. If there were a
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change in that structure, such that, for instance, an indigenous capital
goods industry were set up, the consumer goods industry shifted from
producing standardized import-reproducing goods for the high-income
market, to devising new ways of meeting the needs of those with low
incomes, and income differentials were drastically reduced, then the
situation would be different. At the same time exciting training
possibilities for the institutes and exciting ways in which their trainees
could be utilized would be opened up. As it is, however, it seems likely
that the institutes will be assigned the role, both by the multinational
corporations and by the political petty bourgeoisie, of producing
'service' technicians and craftsmen for the existing structure. This will
also be the role which the institutes' trainees will be looking for, given
the structure of rewards in the economy. Overproduction of trainees
who have been exposed to curricula and syllabuses shaped by the
acceptance of such a role could be a serious matter, since they are
unlikely to be sufficiently adaptable and innovative for lucrative
self-employxtient in their trade. Frustration rather than technicalization
will be the probable outcome.
We turn now to the institutes' indirect effects. Insofar as they transfer
resources from immediate to less immediate productive use they will
slow down the rate of economic growth in their early years. More
important is their possible disequalizing effect on income distribution.
Although conspicuous donations are being extracted from the political
petty bourgeoisie, most local contributors are non-aso mi4, particularly
small farmers. If the institutes persist in their intention to offer courses
mainly for Form IV leavers and set their fees at Shs 3,000 ($420) a year
or more (as has Kiambu)5, it could be said with only slight exaggeration
that money was raised from the poor to provide channels to jobs for
those children of the rich who failed to get into university. Besides
accentuating inequalities between classes within regions there is also a
i.e. the bulk of the African population, outside the political petty bourgeoisie and
not assimilated during colonial times into the role of 'good colonials'. See Mutiso,
'Cleavage and the Organizational Base of Politics in Kenya: a theoretical
framework', Journal of East African Research and Development, vol. 3 (1), 1973.
The ILO Kenya Report estimated that over 76 per cent of households have an
annual income of less than Shs2,400, over 87 per cent less than Shs4,000 and over
96 per cent less than Shsl 2,000.
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danger of accentuating inequalities between regions. Different regions
have different fund-raising capacities, with Central and Rift Valley
Provinces at a distinct advantage. It is no accident that Kiambu and
Muranga, two of the richest districts, have so far been able to raise the
largest amounts locally. Moreover, since the richest region is also the
most influential politically, it seems likely that foreign aid will reinforce
rather than counteract the disequalizing effect. (Kiambu has so far been
the only institute to attract large-scale foreign aid). Of course, politics is
not static and one could make various predictions of success rates' for
institutes depending on the foreign aid implications of future political
scenarios. Most of the feasible ones, however, involve continuing
regional inequality. Moreover the return to their areas of origin of the
bureaucrats, while having the obvious healthy effect of forcing
accountability on politicians, raises the danger of strengthening
rnajzmboistic (regional) feeling. Regular meetings of ethnic elite
members are now being held and, whatever the immediate aims, the
process of interaction inevitably creates local solidarity, at the cost of a
larger divisiveness.
Does the founding of the institutes of technology mark the end of the
explosion in the demand for academic education? This looks unlikely.
For one thing, if they prove initially successful in placing their trainees
in jobs, they will probably be faced with an excess of applicants and
may react to this by raising entry qualifications. This has already
happened to training institutions such as the National Youth Service,
which were originally intended for primary school leavers. Thus the
scramble for academic qualifications as means of entry could be
heightened rather than discouraged by the institutes. Moreover, while
the enthusiasm for technical training is new and, in a sense,
revolutionary from the view of the history of education, the curricula
and syllabuses, as has already been emphasized, are unlikely to be
innovative. Pressure from both the Ministry of Education and
employers will be for 'recognized' qualifications (i.e. trade tests and
City and Guilds). It would be a brave principal who resisted such
pressure, when simultaneously faced with his immediate need to
demonstrate the employability of his products.
The institutes seem to fit in well with the characterization of self-help
as 'pre-emptive development'. That is, they stake a powerful claim to
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future government funds, rather than offer substitute and additional
resources. Indeed, the way in which they were chosen as projects
suggests that their initiators were looking for something not only likely
to be taken over by the government and to attract overseas aid but also
unlikely to be independently initiated by the government. Like
previous harambee projects, the institutes are vehicles for personal
political ambitions. Unlike most previous harambee projects, however,
each of the institutes is too large and covers too wide an area to become
the personal property of a single leader. Quarrels over leadership partly
explain the multiplication of institutes in some areas, particularly
Western Province, and the dead-lock within institutes in others,
particularly Ukamba and Meru.
Moreover, as we have already emphasized, in an important respect the
institutes-of-technology campaign represents something entirely new in
Kenyan politics - the return to their areas of ethnic origin of members
of the bureaucratic stratum of the political petty bourgeoisie. In
describing this group as 'bureaucrats' we are not, of course, intending to
imply that we think they are non-political; indeed, part of our
argument is that they are playing a highly political role. The point is
that this group had not tended to get much involved in harambee
before. Previous projects tended to be on a smaller scale, covering an
area no bigger than a division, and were dominated by members of
parliament who used them as a means of interacting with their
constituents. The importance of bureaucrats in the institutes-
of-technology campaigns can be illustrated by reference to
their predominance among members of critical committees and holders
of national office and, most convincingly, by an analysis of the way in
which the institutes were initiated and the major decisions made. In at
least eleven cases the initiating role of bureaucrats seems to have been
crucial.
Perhaps the most obvious contrast between the institutes and previous
harambee is one of sheer size. The magnitude of the amounts to be
raised has been one of the reasons for the involvement of the provincial
administration in fund-raising, the compulsion exerted on contributors,
the tapping of sources other than kinsmen and the need to look outside
the country for a large proportion of funds. Lonrho, Unilever, Shell BP
and the Aga Khan Group are some of the largest contributors and some
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leading politicians (including the President) have made conspicuous
contributions across ethnic boundaries. Only one institute has been
successful in attracting large-scale foreign aid, however - Kiambu which
has received a grant of some Shs 6.7 million ($0.9 million) from the
Dutch government via a church organization (thus circumventing a rule
that private projects are not allowed to receive aid direct from foreign
governments).
A final, distinctive feature of the institutes, which will already have
become apparent, is the way in which they are a focus for the interests
of a large number of influential groups. They have, for instance, been
legitimized at the highest levels of government, with the President
taking an active part in various ways and many ministers and assistant
ministers being involved in their own area's institutes. The government,
through the provincial administration, is also intimately involved in the
process of raising funds. Multi national corporations have reason to
co-operate with enthusiasm. They are hirers of skilled labour, suppliers
of materials and equipment and, not insignificant, buyers of political
insurance. The lower income-groups who form the majority of
contributors have supported the idea. However, they are beginning to
ask questions about who will benefit, and collection methods are
arousing intense bitterness. In the words of a Murang'a trader, 'We are
not going to sit back and sing 'hallelujah' when our children are
expelled from schools for non-payment of school fees, and when we
cannot take them to hospitals when they fall sick, all in the name of
harambee spirit'.
Few have spoken against the harambee institutes. The most coherent
opposition has come from the professional central planners, largely the
expatriates. They set out the contradiction between official government
planning for technical training, and the threatened distortions by
officials acting in quasi private capacities. Their criticisms, particularly
strong in the early days of the campaign, made sense in the context of
central planning, but ignored the political economy of the situation.
The disappointing response of the foreign aid donors may indicate
suppressed criticism of the deviation from central planning. Equally it
may stem from the strongly political nature of the movement and the
dangers inherent for bilateral aid agencies. Primary school leavers, who
know that the institutes are not for them, take a jaundiced view, but,
despite their numbers, are not politically influential.
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As part of our research we made a special study of the Kiambu Institute
of Science and Technology which began operating in July 1973. This
highlighted the way in which Kiambu bureaucrats have manipulated
their positions to gain access to resources for KIST. Moreover, Kiambu
has set a precedent for access to foreign funds and project planning
expertise, which other institutes will be trying to follow - to the
possible embarrassment of government. The need for a professional
project evaluation and the early appointment of a project director is an
obvious lesson of KIST's experience. Another lesson is that the problem
of cost - both escalating capital cost and the impossibility of raising
enough by fees to cover recurrent expenditure - is likely to be the
major preoccupation of all institutes. By May 1973 the total estimated
capital cost of the project had risen to Shs 19.8 million ($2.8 million) -
more than double the Shs 8.5 million ($ 1.2 million) originally
estimated. Moreover, the fees set at Shs 3,000 per year, although they
meet only half the running costs, are too high for all except those from
wealthy families. The final lesson of our Kiambu case-study is that the
pressures of the existing political economy largely determine what it is
possible for an institute to do, even though a wary attitude towards the
proposals of foreign companies can be shown.6 Thus KIST is offering a
two-year building course, with three streams (carpentry, masonry and
plumbing). It is oriented towards eventual self-employment, and
involves practical work during the course inside and outside KIST as
well as training in the techniques of management. However, the course
will also fit in with the existing formal system by taking entrants direct
from secondary technical school (Form IV) and by offering a
preliminary year to those who have been to a non-technical secondary
school to take them up to East African Certificate of Education
(technical) standard. Moreover, while the main qualifications to be
offered will be a KIST certificate, trainees will be able to take
government trade tests. And while KIST has admirably insisted that all
applicants should take aptitude tests, it has stopped short of opening
access to these tests to those with less than four years of secondary
schooling. In short, the institute has implicitly recognized (1) that it
must demonstrate the employability of its products within the existing
structure and that a wage-earning job is what most trainees will be
6 Kiambu turned down an offer from one company of a grant to finance courses in
the use of repair of that company's equipment.
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looking for and (2) that unemployed secondary-schooled entrants are
available in large numbers and are regarded by the elite as one of
Kenya's most serious problems.
With the institutes of technology we have obviously come a long way
from the original concept of 'self-help' projects. In effect, the full
weight of individual members of the government and of the provincial
administration has been thrown behind the raising of funds to build
institutions the recurrent financing of which will at some time become
the responsibility of the government. What exactly they will eventually
look like remains to be seen. But even at this early stage they have
aroused unprecedented interest in Kenya and have become the catalyst
of a wide-ranging discussion involving politics, economics and
technology as well as education and training. Further, they have
reinforced the lesson of the original harambee schools: namely, the
difficulties of centralized educational planning in a situation where
schooling is indispensable to advancement - and therefore intensely
pursued - and where self-help projects are used by politicians and
'non-politicians' alike as a means of attracting local political support.
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